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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMICS OF DRUG ABUSE
BY
VICTOR AMUZU
May, 2022
Committee Chair: Dr. Michael Pesko
Major Department: Economics
This dissertation consists of three essays on substance abuse. The first essay examines
whether restricting access to legal prescription opioids has an impact on substance abuse
behavior. Following the increase in people taking hydrocodone combination products (HCPs) in
dangerous amounts, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) requested the Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS) to conduct thorough research on HCPs. After evaluating
the medical evidence, the DHHS recommended that all HCPs be transferred from a Schedule III
to a Schedule II controlled substance. In 2014, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
implemented the rescheduling of HCPs. The total number of HCPs prescriptions in the U.S fell
from 136.7 million in 2013 to 83.6 million in 2017. Subsequently, the number of persons
misusing HCPs also declined from 7.2 million in 2015 to about 5.5 million in 2018 (National
Survey on Drug Use and Health, 2020). Using data from the 2005 to 2019 Treatment Episode
Data Set (TEDS) survey, I analyze the effect of the policy on substance abuse behavior. I employ
a difference-in-differences strategy that explores the cross-state variation in the preimplementation hydrocodone prescription rate. I find evidence that suggests that the rescheduling

led to a reduction in the utilization of hydrocodone combination medications. Given this
evidence of a "first-stage" effect, I also assess whether the decline in legally-obtained opioid
prescriptions affects the misuse of other substances. I find that a one percentage point increase in
the mean hydrocodone prescription (i.e., 13kg per 100,000 residents) increases alcohol abuse
treatments by 63 treatments per 100,000 adults, marijuana abuse treatments by 40 treatments per
100,000 adults, and cocaine abuse treatments by 13.2 treatments per 100,000 adults.
The second essay investigates whether the rescheduling of HCPs could potentially have a
spillover effect on crime. By reducing the supply of HCPs through the rescheduling, the policy
may have had an unintended consequence on the cost of obtaining illegal prescription opioids.
To explore this question, I use arrest data from 2006 to 2019 from the Uniform Crime Reporting
(UCR) program provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) combined with a
difference-in-differences strategy. I find evidence that the rescheduling of HCPs led to an
increase in violent crimes. I estimate that violent crimes increased by 23.9 offenses per 100,000.
The increase in violent crimes is driven by an increase in aggravated assault crimes.
The final essay in my dissertation investigates the impact of the Affordable Care Act's
(ACAs) Medicaid expansion on the access and the utilization of substance use disorder (SUD)
treatment. After the implementation of the Affordable Care Act, individuals with SUD have
greater access to treatment through various programs and policy changes. To estimate the effect
of the policy, I exploit the variation in the timing of the Medicaid expansion across states. I find
that the ACA's Medicaid expansion led to a 36% decrease in the number of uninsured substance
abuse patients and a 90% increase in Medicaid insurance coverage among the same group.
Following the gains in insurance coverage among substance abuse patients, one would expect an
increase in the utilization of substance abuse treatment. I measure the utilization of substance

abuse treatment using the number of admissions per 100,000 non-elderly adults and treatment
completion status. The results show that the ACA's Medicaid expansion had no statistically
significant effect on substance abuse treatment admissions. A potential explanation for this is
that access to health insurance coverage alone may not impose a substantial barrier to seeking
substance abuse treatment.

ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMICS OF DRUG ABUSE
By
Victor Amuzu

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies
of
Georgia State University

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY
2022

Copyright by
Victor Amuzu
2022

ACCEPTANCE
This dissertation was prepared under the direction of the candidate’s Dissertation Committee. It has been approved and accepted by all members of that committee, and it has been
accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in
Economics in the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies of Georgia State University.

Dissertation Chair: Dr. Michael Pesko
Committee:

Electronic Version Approved:
Dr. Sally Wallace, Dean
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies
Georgia State University
May, 2022

Dr. James Marton
Dr. Keith Teltser
Dr. Elizabeth Armstrong-Mensah

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to my mom and dad for their support and
encouragement throughout my life. My auntie and sisters deserve my unqualified appreciation as
well.
I am deeply grateful to my advisor, Dr. Michael Pesko, for his guidance throughout my
doctoral study and especially for his insight that steered me through this dissertation. In addition,
I am grateful to him for the interpretation of some of the results presented in this dissertation. I
would also like to thank Dr. Marton for serving as a member on my dissertation committee. Dr.
Marton's comments and questions at my presentations were very valuable. I thank Dr.
Armstrong-Mensah and Dr. Teltser for their remarkable suggestions and guidance.
To all my friends, Christian family at Georgia State University, professors, thank you for
your encouragement.
Finally, thank you, my God and personal savior, for always being there for me, listening
to all my prayers.

iv

Table of Contents
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................................. iv
List of Tables ............................................................................................................................... vii
List of Figures .............................................................................................................................. viii
Chapter 1 Hydrocodone Combination Products and the Rescheduling .......................................... 1
1.1

Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1

1.2

Literature Review............................................................................................................ 3

1.2.1 Prescription Opioid Abuse .......................................................................................... 3
1.2.2 Policy Interventions Targeting the Opioid Epidemic ................................................. 5
1.2.3 The Rescheduling of HCPs ......................................................................................... 5
1.3

Data ................................................................................................................................. 6

1.4

Empirical Strategy .......................................................................................................... 9

1.4.1 Event Study ............................................................................................................... 10
1.5

Results ........................................................................................................................... 11

1.6

Discussions ................................................................................................................... 16

Chapter 2 The Rescheduling of Hydrocodone Combination Products and Crime ..................... 23
2.1

Introduction ................................................................................................................... 23

2.2

Literature Review.......................................................................................................... 24

2.2.1 The Rescheduling of Hydrocodone Combination Products...................................... 26
2.3

Data and Empirical Strategy ......................................................................................... 27

v

2.4

Results ........................................................................................................................... 30

2.5

Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 33

Chapter 3 Does Expanding Health Insurance Coverage Lead to an Increase in Substance Abuse
Treatment Utilization? .................................................................................................................. 38
3.1

Introduction ................................................................................................................... 38

3.2

Literature Review.......................................................................................................... 40

3.3

Data and Empirical Strategy ......................................................................................... 42

3.4

Results ........................................................................................................................... 46

3.5

Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 49

References ..................................................................................................................................... 53
Vita............................................................................................................................................... 60

vi

List of Tables
Table 1.1 Summary Statistics of Dependent Variables ................................................................ 18
Table 1.2 Summary Statistics State Characteristics ...................................................................... 19
Table 1.3 Effect of the Rescheduling of HCPs on Hydrocodone-Acetaminophen Prescription .. 20
Table 1.4 Effect of the Rescheduling of HCPs on the Primary Substance Abused ...................... 21
Table 1.5 Effect of the Rescheduling of HCPs on the Primary Substance Abused (Exposure) ... 22
Table 1.6 Effect of the Rescheduling of HCPs on the Primary Substance Abused (No Weights) 22
Table 2.1 Summary Statistics of Outcome Variables ................................................................... 34
Table 2.2 Summary Statistics of State Characteristics ................................................................. 35
Table 2.3 Effect of the Rescheduling of Hydrocodone Combination Products on Crime: Analysis
2006 – 2019................................................................................................................................... 37
Table 3.1 Summary Statistics ....................................................................................................... 50
Table 3.2 Effect of ACA Medicaid Expansions on Insurance Status ........................................... 51
Table 3.3 Effect of ACA Medicaid Expansions on Admissions and Treatment Completion Rates
....................................................................................................................................................... 52

vii

List of Figures
Figure 1.1 Effect of the rescheduling on substance abuse treatment ............................................ 14
Figure 2.1 Effect of the Rescheduling on Crime .......................................................................... 32
Figure 3.1 Effect of the Medicaid expansion on Insurance Status ............................................... 48
Figure 3.2 Effect of the Medicaid Expansion on Substance Abuse Treatment Utilization .......... 48

viii

Chapter 1
Hydrocodone Combination Products and the Rescheduling
1.1

Introduction
The Controlled Substance Act (CSA) of 1970 was created under Title II of the

Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act. Its purpose was to classify controlled
substances under five schedules according to their potential for abuse and whether they are
currently accepted for medical use in the United States. The law gave the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) the authority to implement and enforce the provisions of the Controlled
Substance Act by coordinating with both states and local governments to prevent the diversion or
misuse of controlled substances. The Drug Enforcement Administration could transfer or add a
controlled substance to a schedule when evidence suggests that a controlled substance has a high
potential for abuse.
After the Drug Enforcement Administration received new evidence from the Department
of Health and Human Services (DHHS) that Hydrocodone-containing products (HCPs) have a
high potential for abuse, the agency rescheduled hydrocodone-containing products from a
Schedule III substance of the Controlled Substance Act to a schedule II substance in 20141.
HCPs contain a limited amount of hydrocodone and specified amounts of other controlled
substances. Hydrocodone-containing products were initially listed as a Schedule III drug when
Congress passed the Controlled Substances Act in 1971. HCPs are the most commonly
prescribed opioid in the United States (U.S) (Physician Assistant Board, 2014). Over 136 million
hydrocodone-containing prescriptions were dispensed in 2013, and about 70.9 million HCPs

1

Schedule II prescriptions prescribed for a legitimate medical purpose must be presented to the pharmacy in written
form and signed by the prescriber except in an emergency. In addition, while Schedule III controlled substances may
be refilled up to 5 times in a 6-month period, Schedule II medications cannot be refilled, and a new prescription
must be written every time.

1

were dispensed in 2018 (Drug Enforcement Administration, 2019). About 5.5 million individuals
above the age of 12 misused hydrocodone-containing products in 2018 (National Survey on
Drug Use and Health, 2018).
While economists have not studied the effect of the rescheduling yet, clinicians have
found associations with the rescheduling and opioid analgesic prescribing and pain management
practices (Jones, Lurie, & Throckmorton, 2016; Fleming et al., 2019; Neuman et al., 2020). This
study is motivated by the evidence from the existing literature that the rescheduling of
hydrocodone-containing products has led to a reduction in the supply of legally obtained opioids.
In this chapter, I estimate the causal effect of placing hydrocodone-containing products into the
more restrictive Schedule II category of the Controlled Substance Act on the primary substance
abused among substance use disorder (SUD) patients. I explore the cross-state variation in the
pre-implementation hydrocodone prescription rates.
Theoretically, the rescheduling of HCPs could induce either substitutionary or cessation
behavior among substance abuse patients, making the impact of the rescheduling on the primary
drug of addiction ambiguous. The rescheduling of HCPs acts as an adverse supply shock for
opioid prescriptions. All else equal, the negative supply shock may lead to an increase in the
price of diverted legally-obtained opioids, which could lead HCPs abusers to find a cheaper
alternative or pay the higher prices. Using the street prices of cocaine and heroin obtained by
undercover law enforcement agents, Dave (2005) studies the impact of the changes in the price
of cocaine and heroin price on drug-related emergency department visits in 16 cities in the U.S.
Dave (2005) finds that between 1990 and 2002 the price of heroin and cocaine declined 72% and
42% respectively. The decline in the prices of heroin and cocaine coincided with an increase in
heroin and cocaine-related emergency department cases. The study also evaluates the
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responsiveness of heroin and cocaine-related emergency department cases to changes in cocaine
and heroin prices. Dave (2005) finds that the elasticity of the probability of cocaine-related
emergency department cases with respect to own price is −0.27. Lastly, the increase in street
price and limited supply of HCPs could also decrease the number of persons who initiate
hydrocodone-containing products. These factors could influence the primary substance abused
among SUD patients.
I investigate the impact of the policy on the primary substance abused among substance
use disorder patients by leveraging data from the Treatment Episode Dataset. The data contains
the demographic and substance use history of individuals seeking SUD treatment. I identify the
effect of the policy by using baseline-level differences in the hydrocodone prescription rates
across states before the rescheduling. I found evidence that suggests that the rescheduling led to a
reduction in the utilization of hydrocodone combination medications. Given this evidence of a
"first-stage" effect, I also assess whether the decline in legally-obtained opioid prescriptions
affects the misuse of other substances. I found that a one percentage point increase in the mean
hydrocodone prescription (i.e., 13kg per 100,000 residents) increases alcohol abuse treatments
by 63 treatments per 100,000 adults, marijuana abuse treatments by 40 treatments per 100,000
adults, and cocaine abuse treatments by 13.2 treatments per 100,000 adults.

1.2
1.2.1

Literature Review
Prescription Opioid Abuse
Prescription opioids interact with opioid receptors in the body and brain to produce

varying effects. While prescription opioids are safe, particularly when taken for a short time and
as prescribed by a doctor, several studies suggest that they can be abused (National Institute on
3

Drug Abuse, 2020; Brady et al., 2016). The use of opioids for medical and non-medical purposes
can lead to physical dependence on the substance. Consequently, prescription opioids are among
the most common initiated drugs, with over 5,800 initiates per day in 2015 (SAMHSA, 2015).
The pervasiveness of prescription opioid abuse became popular in the U.S in the 1990s.
The opioid epidemic began in the late 1990s when pharmaceutical companies assured both
patients and medical professionals that prescription opioids could not be easily abused. As a
result, prescription opioids were dispensed in large quantities, leading to an increase in opioid
abuse and physical dependence on the substance (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
2020).
Opioid addiction carries a high societal and economic cost (McAdam-Marx et al. 2010;
McCarty et al. 2010; Leider et al. 2011; Kirson et al. 2017). According to the Council of
Economic Advisers (CEA), the economic burden of prescription opioid abuse is estimated to cost
$504 billion in 2015 (Council of Economic Advisers, 2017). White et al. (2005) reveals that, on
average, the medical expenses of substance abusers are eight times higher than that of normal
people. These expenses are primarily driven by the high utilization of hospital services among
substance abusers. Chen et al. (2014) use mortality data from the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention to show that between 1999 and 2011, the opioid overdose mortality rate
quadrupled in the U.S. Similarly, opioid-overdose emergency room visits accounted for 2.5
million emergency department visits in 2011 alone (SAMHSA, 2013). The increase in healthcare
utilization due to opioid abuse exerts an enormous burden on healthcare resources. Leslie et al.
(2019) collected Medicaid service utilization data from Medicaid Analytic eXtract to investigate
the economic burden of opioid treatment on the Medicaid program. According to their
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calculations, opioid use disorder increased Medicaid expenses by 72 billion between 1999 and
2013.

1.2.2

Policy Interventions Targeting the Opioid Epidemic
The federal government and several states have implemented various policies aimed at

curbing prescription opioid abuse. These policies can be categorized into demand-side and
supply-side interventions. Examples of supply-side interventions include Prescription Drug
Monitoring Programs (PDMPs), Medicaid Lock-In Programs, pain clinic laws, and abusedeterrent drug formulations. On the other hand, the demand-side interventions include educating
individuals (would-be users) against the harmful effects of opioids and the provision of treatment
to current abusers to reduce their demand. Ruhm (2018) acknowledges that while it is unlikely
for the demand for opioids to decline in the short run dramatically, supply-side interventions
generate a sudden decline in the supply of opioids due to technological advancements.

1.2.3

The Rescheduling of HCPs
The rescheduling of HCPs, which is the identifying variation I use in this study, has

changed medical opioid prescription patterns. Using linear regression analysis and data from the
IMS Health National Prescription Audit, Zalts et al. (2016) compare the differences between
predicted dispensed prescriptions and actual dispensed prescriptions and tablets after
rescheduling. Their results indicate that the rescheduling of HCPS led to a 16% decrease in
HCPs in the first year of the policy. After examining pain-related prescription data at the
emergency department before and after the rescheduling of HCPs, Oehle et al. (2016) find that
before the policy change for every ten patients receiving a pain-related prescription, five received
5

an HCP. However, after the implementation of the rescheduling, only one in ten patients
received an HCP. Their logistic regression analysis also shows that new patients are more likely
to be prescribed other Schedule III and non–Schedule II/III products. Another study conducted
on the changes in prescription patterns in Ohio after the rescheduling of hydrocodone
combination products suggests that the policy led to a large decline in hydrocodone prescription
and an increase in codeine prescription (Liu, Baker, Schuur, & Weiner, 2020).

1.3

Data
The study assumes that the effect of the rescheduling of hydrocodone-containing

products should lead to a higher reduction in hydrocodone-containing prescriptions per capita in
states with a relatively high hydrocodone prescription rate before 2014. To show this, I obtained
hydrocodone sales data in kilograms per 100,000 residents from the Automation of Reports and
Consolidated Orders System (ARCOS). The Automation of Reports and Consolidated Orders
System is a reporting system that tracks the production and the distribution of controlled
substances. The DEA maintains the ARCOS. I used the 2011 hydrocodone sales data as the main
treatment variable because it predates the rescheduling.
For the first-stage effect, I showed that the rescheduling of hydrocodone-containing
products should affect the total number of hydrocodone combination products dispensed. I used
Medicare Provider Utilization and Payment Data: Part D Prescriber Public Use File from the
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) to show that placing hydrocodone-containing
products in schedule II of the Controlled Substance Act led to a decrease in the number of
hydrocodone-containing products dispensed. The Medicare Part D dataset is a census of
prescription claims for enrollees. These individuals include adults above the age of 64 years and
6

the disabled. About 44 million individuals enrolled in the program in 2020. The dataset records
the drug name, the total claim count2, the total 30-day fill count3, the total daily supply of
prescriptions, and the total drug cost made by each prescriber. The Medicare Part D dataset is
appealing for this study because of the way hydrocodone-containing prescriptions are reported in
the dataset. Unlike the Medicaid prescription dataset, the Medicare Part D dataset does not
classify the combination medication into separate groups4. I obtained prescription data on
Hydrocodone-Acetaminophen, a popular hydrocodone-containing product frequently prescribed
for moderate-to-severe pain control, from the Medicare Part D dataset for the years 2013 to
2018. For the analysis, the data was rolled up to the state level.
To investigate the impact of the rescheduling of HCPs on the changes in the primary
substance abused among substance use disorder patients, I obtained data from the Treatment
Episode Data Set (TEDS-A). The TEDS-A is a compilation of data of admissions into substance
abuse treatment centers in the U.S. While the data does not include every admission into
treatment facilities in the U.S, it captures a large share of admissions nationwide5. The data
reported to TEDS-A is obtained from certified state substance abuse agencies that provide
substance abuse treatment. Each record in the TEDS-A table represents admission into a
treatment facility. The TEDS-A data contains demographic information, date of admission,
substance use behavior, and primary substance use at the admission of substance abuse patients.
Data from the 2005 to 2019 TEDS-A census were obtained for this study. The data was

2

The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) defines the total claim count as the total number of
Medicare Part D claims which includes initial prescriptions and refills.
3
The overall number of Medicare Part D standardized 30-day fills.
4
While the Medicare Part D dataset labels Hydrocodone-Acetaminophen as one medication, the Medicaid dataset
labels Hydrocodone-Acetaminophen as two separate medications (i.e., hydrocodone and acetaminophen).
Commercial claims data could also be used for this type of analysis, but I do not have access to the data.
5
According to SAMHSA, nearly 2 million individuals are admitted into 10,000 publicly and privately funded
treatment programs each year.
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transformed into state-year counts of the various primary substances abused by substance use
disorder patients. Using data from the TEDS-A, I construct several outcome variables that
correspond with the various addiction substances. These variables include the count of Alcohol,
Cocaine, Cannabis, Heroin, and Methamphetamine per 100,000 adults admitted into a substance
use disorder treatment facility in a state.
I controlled for other time-varying and state-specific laws that various studies have
identified to be associated with substance abuse (Salomonsen-Sautel et al., 2012; Bachhuber et
al., 2014; Hefei, Jason, & Cummings, 2015; McClellan et al., 2018; Alley, Kerr, & Bae, 2020).
These laws can be categorized into two main groups. The first set of laws consist of opioid
prescription laws. Data on the opioid prescription laws were obtained from Meara et al. (2016).
Meara et al. (2016) assembled a database of 81 state controlled-substance laws from 2006
through 2012. After extending the Meara et al. (2016) database from 2016 to 2019, I include the
following opioid prescription laws in my model: (1) ID Requirement laws6, (2) Doctor Shopping
laws7, (3) Prescription Limit laws8, and (4) Prescription Drug Monitoring Program laws9. I also
controlled for the 2010 abuse-deterrent reformulation of oxycodone using oxycodone misuse
data from Alpert et al. (2018). The second set of laws are marijuana-related laws. They include
marijuana decriminalization laws, recreational marijuana laws, and medical marijuana laws. The
Marijuana law variables were obtained from Pacula and Smart (2017). Pacula and Smart (2017)
constructed a database of such policies, most of which aimed to decriminalize and legalize

6

ID Requirement laws require pharmacists to request identification (ID) before dispensing a controlled substance.
In some states, it is unlawful to obtain controlled substances from multiple medical practitioners without informing
each practitioner about previous prescriptions.
8
Prescription limit laws regulate the quantity of prescription dispensed and the number of days before a prescription
can be refilled.
9
The PDMP maintains an electronic database on controlled substance prescriptions in a state. Meara et al. (2016)
classify a state as having PDMP only when the PDMP is fully operational.
7

8

marijuana use. I also obtained the state-level income distribution and unemployment rate from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The state-level socioeconomic characteristics such as age,
race, gender, education, and marital status were collected from the American Community Survey
(ACS), which was downloaded from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS).

1.4

Empirical Strategy
To identify the effect of the rescheduling of hydrocodone combination products, I

explored the cross-state variation in the pre-treatment hydrocodone prescription rate. In theory,
the impact of the rescheduling should have more "bite" in states with a higher preimplementation hydrocodone prescription rate. Alpert et al. (2018) and Evans et al. (2019) use
this “bite”- style approach to estimate the impact of the 2010 OxyContin reformulation on heroin
and other types of opioid overdoses10. Other studies in economics use the same methodology
(Acemoglu et al., 2004; Finkelstein,2007; Courtemanche et al., 2016).
In this study, I used a similar approach. I explored the variation in the hydrocodone
prescription rate across states before the implementation of the policy. I used the hydrocodone
sales data in 2011 from the ARCOS as the bite variable for this study. I then estimated a twoway fixed-effect model using the Medicare Part D data from 2013 to 2018, and the TED-A data
from 2005 to 2019. The model is specified as follows:
Yst = b0 + b1Postt + b2HPRs + b3(HPRs * Postt) + b4Xst +as + dt + gtt + est

10

(1)

Using the variations in the pre-reformulation OxyContin misuse rates across states as their exposure variable,
Alpert et al. (2018) find that heroin overdose deaths were notably greater in states with higher pre-reformulation
OxyContin misuse rates.
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where Yst is the outcome variable in state s, and year t; Postt is an indicator for whether the
period is either before or after 2014 (the year of the rescheduling). HPRs is the hydrocodone
prescription rate in state s in 2011 obtained from the ARCOs data. Xst is a set of dummies for a
several drug policies, and economic and demographic control variables. as and dt are the state
and time fixed effect respectively. I also included a state-specific linear time trend, gtt, in the
model. Standard errors were clustered at the state level, which is the level at which the bite
variable varies. I estimated the outcomes using the state’s population as weight.

1.4.1

Event Study
I assess the assumption that in the absence of the rescheduling of the HCPs, the

differences in the outcomes would have continued in the same trends. To test whether this
assumption holds, I performed an event study analysis. The event study model interacts the
hydrocodone prescription rate with the full set of year fixed effects, leaving 2013 as the reference
year. The event study equation is specified as:
*+,

!!" = b# + b

$

% (HPR % ∗ Year& ) + b' 0() + a( + g) + g) 1 + e()

(2)

-./-01-

If the parallel trend assumption holds, I would expect the interaction of the year indicator for
2005, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, and the hydrocodone prescription rate to be
statistically insignificant or very small. In other words, finding a trend in states with lower or
higher pre-rescheduling HCP prescribing rates would pose a threat the validity of the
identification strategy.
To show that my results are robust to alternative measures of exposure to the
hydrocodone combination products, I constructed a new exposure variable using state-level
10

averages of HCP sales data from ARCOS. I used the annual kilograms sold of hydrocodone per
100,000 people data from 2008 to 2011 compared to just the rate in 2011. As a second
robustness check, I re-estimated my regressions without population weights. According to Solon
et al. (2013), if the variation of the group-mean error term is large, the ordinary least squares
regression without weights yields the best-unbiased coefficients.

1.5

Results
Summary statistics for the dependent variables from the Medicare Part D data and the

TEDS-A are provided in Table 1.1, stratified by states with a hydrocodone prescription rate
above or below the 2011 median hydrocodone prescription rate. In high hydrocodone prescribing
states, the average daily supply for Hydrocodone-Acetaminophen among Medicare Part D
patients was 1,658.2 pills per 10,000 elderly adults11, and the 30-day fill count was 82.4 pills per
10,000 elderly adults. In contrast, the average daily supply for Hydrocodone-Acetaminophen was
605.1 pills per 10,000 elderly adults, and the 30-day fill count was 34.7 pills per 10,000 elderly
adults in low hydrocodone prescribing states. There were fewer patients per 100,000 residents
seeking treatment for alcohol, cocaine, marijuana, and heroin abuse in high hydrocodone
prescribing states compared to low hydrocodone prescribing states. On average, 54.7 patients per
100,000 residents were admitted to SUD treatment for methamphetamine abuse in high
hydrocodone prescribing states. The state characteristics are reported in Table 1.2. Low
hydrocodone prescribing states have a higher proportion of men to women, a lower
unemployment rate, and a lower poverty rate.

11

Individuals above the age of 64 years.
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Next, I discuss the results of the impact of the rescheduling of hydrocodone-containing
products on hydrocodone/acetaminophen prescription for Medicare Part D patients. I consider
the effect of the policy on the various measures of hydrocodone/acetaminophen prescription,
including the total daily supply, total 30-day fill count, and total claim count. This investigation
aims to provide statistical evidence of the first stage effect of the policy. Table 3 reports the
coefficient estimates for the post-rescheduling indicator interacted with the hydrocodone
prescribing rate. The coefficient estimates for the hydrocodone prescribing rate and postrescheduling indicator interaction suggest that the rescheduling of hydrocodone-containing
products in 2014 reduces the total daily prescription for hydrocodone/acetaminophen by 15.9
pills per 10,000 elderly residents. In the second column of Table 1.3, I estimate that the policy
reduces the total 30-day fill count for hydrocodone/acetaminophen by 0.9 pills per 1,000
residents. Similarly, I find that the rescheduling of hydrocodone-containing products reduces the
total claim count for hydrocodone/acetaminophen. Taken together, these results suggest that the
rescheduling reduces hydrocodone-acetaminophen, a commonly prescribed hydrocodonecontaining product, prescription among Medicare patients.
In Table 1.4, I examine the effect of the rescheduling of hydrocodone combination
products on the primary substance use at admission among SUD patients. If the rescheduling of
hydrocodone combination products is operating by limiting access to prescription opioids, we
would expect more SUD patients to seek treatment for opioid abuse or other substances that are
substitutes for opioids. The covariate-adjusted regressions are from the estimation of equation
(1). In column 1, I find that the rescheduling of hydrocodone combination products had no
statistically significant effect on total admissions into SUD treatment facilities in areas with
higher versus lower baseline shares of opioids per capita. Columns 2 to 6 reports results for
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specific primary substance (e.g., marijuana, heroin, cocaine, alcohol, and methamphetamine)
used among SUD patients. In column 2 of Table 1.4, I estimate an effect size of 3 for the
coefficient of interest. This implies that a one percentage point higher rate of initial hydrocodone
prescription increases the number of persons primarily abusing marijuana by 3 substance use
disorder patients per 100,000 residents. At the average pretreatment hydrocodone prescription
rate, marijuana abuse treatments increased by 40.4 treatments per 100,000 adults. The result is
statistically significant at the one percent level.
Column 3 of Table 1.4 shows the effect of restricting access to hydrocodone-containing
products on SUD admissions for alcohol abuse. I consider the direction of the effect as an
indicator for the demand for alcohol abuse. Indeed, I find that the number of individuals seeking
treatment for alcohol abuse increases by 4.6 treatments per 100,000 residents (p < 0.01) after the
rescheduling of hydrocodone-containing products is implemented. At the average pretreatment
hydrocodone prescription rate, alcohol abuse treatments increased by 62.7 treatments per
100,000 adults. The prevalence of alcohol abuse among SUD patients is consistent with the
addiction literature, revealing that the probability of abusing alcohol increases with the decrease
in the supply of hydrocodone combination products (Riley and King, 2009; Witkiewitz and
Vowles, 2018).
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 1.4 shed light on the impact of the rescheduling on SUD
treatment for heroin and cocaine addiction, respectively. I find that following the rescheduling of
hydrocodone combination products, the number of persons receiving SUD treatment for heroin
abuse declined by 3.1 treatments per 100,000 residents. The rescheduling of hydrocodonecontaining products is also associated with an increase in SUD admissions for individuals who
primarily abuse cocaine. I find that a one percentage point increase in the initial hydrocodone
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prescription rate is associated with a 0.9 per 100,000 residents increase in cocaine abusers
receiving SUD treatment. Lastly, in column 6 of Table 1.4, I find that the policy has no
statistically significant effect on treatment admissions for methamphetamine abuse.

Figure 1.1 Effect of the rescheduling on substance abuse treatment

In Figure 1.1, I show the event study results of the rescheduling of hydrocodone
combination products on the several primary substances used by SUD patients. The results of
interest are the full set of the interaction of the year indicator for 2006,2007,2008,2009,2010,
2011, 2012, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, and the hydrocodone prescription rate coefficients.
Each graph shows the coefficient estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals for every year. In
figure 1.1, I observe limited evidence of non-parallel trends for the overall admissions, alcohol
abuse admissions, and cocaine abuse admissions. The event study estimates for these outcome
variables are close to zero and statistically insignificant nearly every year before the rescheduling
14

of hydrocodone-containing products. As a result, the differences-in-difference estimator reflects
a causal effect of the rescheduling of HCP for alcohol abuse and cocaine abuse admissions. The
event study result also shows that there was an immediate increase in the number of SUD
patients in the year after the policy change that reported abusing alcohol and cocaine. The
marijuana abuse admissions event study displays a pre-existing downward trend in states with a
higher baseline rate of HCP prescribing that appears to level out a few years before the
rescheduling occurs. Similarly, the heroin abuse admissions event study also shows a preexisting upward trend. Thus, the differences-in-difference estimate for heroin abuse and
marijuana abuse admissions may be biased.
In table 1.5, I present results that show the robustness of the model to using as the bite
variable the average rate of hydrocodone prescribing between 2008 to 2011. By averaging the
exposure variable, I eliminate the likelihood of picking up some effects related to a one-time
surge in hydrocodone prescription rate in a particular state before the rescheduling I estimate that
an additional percentage point of hydrocodone prescription rate before the rescheduling increases
alcohol abuse treatments by 4.8 treatments per 100,000 adults and marijuana abusers receiving
treatment by 2.9 treatments per 100,000 adults. These results are comparable to the baseline
results in both magnitude and direction12.
Table 1.6 presents the results when the model is estimated without population weights. After
estimating the model without population weight, I find that an additional percentage point of
hydrocodone prescription before the rescheduling increases the number of individuals receiving
treatment for alcohol abuse by 5.5 treatments per 100,000 adults. The effect size is almost the
same as the effect size estimated using population weights (i.e., 4.6 treatments per 100,000
12

I estimate an effect size of 4.6 SUD patients per 100,000 adults for alcohol abuse treatment and an effect size of 3
SUD patients per 100,000 adults for marijuana abuse treatment using the baseline model.
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adults). Similar to the baseline model, the rescheduling had no statistically significant effect on
the overall number of persons admitted into SUD treatment facility per 100,000 adults and the
number of persons receiving treatment for methamphetamine abuse per 100,000 adults. The
other results remain generally comparable to the main results.

1.6

Discussions
The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of the rescheduling of hydrocodone

combination products from a schedule III controlled substance to a schedule II controlled
substance on the primary substance abused among SUD patients. By placing hydrocodone
combination products in schedule II of the Controlled Substance Act, the DEA imposes
regulatory controls and criminal penalties relevant to schedule II controlled substances on
individuals who manufacture and distribute hydrocodone combination products. The new
regulatory controls imposed on hydrocodone combination products act as a negative supply
shock for legally-obtained opioids, which could lead to changes in the primary abuse substance
among substance abusers. I find suggestive evidence of this behavior using data from the
Treatment Episode Dataset.
The Treatment Episode Dataset is ideally suited to study the impact of the policy on the
changes in the primary substance abused because the data, even though self-reported, is collected
at a drug treatment facility at the time of client intake. This practice ensures that the data remains
accurate since the client has to report the correct information to receive the appropriate
treatment. Secondly, the Treatment Episode Dataset reports the primary, secondary, and tertiary
substances of use reported by the client. By including the various levels of substance misuse in
the data, individuals abusing multiple substances can accurately report their drug abuse habits.
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Using the Treatment Episode Dataset to investigate the impact of rescheduling on the
primary substance abused among SUD patients, I find that the policy is associated with an
increase in the number of persons seeking substance use disorder treatment for marijuana and
alcohol abuse. Specifically, I find that following the rescheduling of hydrocodone-containing
products, a one percentage point higher rate of initial hydrocodone prescription rate increases
alcohol abuse treatments by 62.7 treatments per 100,000 adults and marijuana abuse treatments
by 40.4 treatments per 100,000 adults. The policy has no statistically significant effect on
Cocaine abusers, Heroin abusers, Methamphetamine, and Other Opiates abusers.
This study makes several significant contributions to the literature on substance abuse. To
the best of my knowledge, this is the first empirical work that studies the impact of the
rescheduling on the primary substance abused by SUD patients. Many of the prior studies on the
rescheduling of hydrocodone combination products have only focused on identifying the causal
effect of the policy on the changes in opioid prescribing practices (Oehle et al., 2016; Lui et al.,
2020). I extend the literature on the rescheduling by providing empirical evidence of the impact
of the policy on pain management and addiction behavior. The results suggest that tackling the
opioid crisis by restricting access to prescription opioids may have an unintended consequence
on pain management. The first-stage results presuppose that the rescheduling of HCPs has led to
an increase in untreated pain. Patients with chronic pain and surgical post-op patients now have
limited access to hydrocodone-acetaminophen. Thus, the policy reduces the welfare of people
that have a clinical need for pain relief. Lastly, while there has been a 44 percent reduction in
opioid prescription across the country as of 2020, substance abuse-related deaths have been on
the rise. This research offers a potential explanation for the phenomenon and helps policymakers
understand the intricate relationship between substances.
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Table 1.1 Summary Statistics of Dependent Variables
High Hydrocodone
Low Hydrocodone
Prescribing states
Prescribing States
Medicare Part D: Hydrocodone-Acetaminophen Prescription data (per 10,000 elderly adults)
Total claim count

80.9
(25.4)

34.06
(14.21)

Total 30-day fill count

82.40
(25.7)

34.71
(14.5)

1,658.2
(585.16)

605.10
(245.9)

52

50

Total daily supply
Observations

TEDS-A: Substance Use Disorder Admissions data (per 100,000 individuals above the age of 12)
Total admissions

607.0
(305.7)

1044.6
(515.7)

Alcohol admissions

239.1
(162.2)

500.6
(372.2)

Cocaine admissions

55.7
(41.8)

69.97
(63.1)

Marijuana admissions

116.73
(61.5)

148.94
(76.8)

Heroin admissions

46.8
(54.6)

152.7
(184.8)

Methamphetamine admissions

65.3
(78.9)

48.1
(62.6)

247

255

Observations

Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Data were analyzed 2005 to 2014 for the TEDS-A dataset. The Medicaid Part D

data were analyzed from 2013 to 2014. States with hydrocodone prescription rate below the median of 11.1 kg per 100,000
persons were classified as low HPR states while states with hydrocodone prescription rate above the median rate were classified
as high HPR states. Tennessee, North Dakota, New Mexico, Nebraska, and District of Columbia had missing observations for
some years.
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Table 1.2 Summary Statistics State Characteristics
High Hydrocodone
Prescribing states

Low Hydrocodone
Prescribing States

% Male

48.8

49.1

% Aged below 20

24.3

23.6

% Aged 20 to 40

23.1

23.3

% Aged 40 to 60

26.8

27.6

% White

78.7

78.6

% Black

22.8

15.1

% Single

40.3

41.7

% Married

42.6

43.2

% With zero children

73.2

73.5

% With one child

12.8

12.5

% High School Degree

31.5

29.9

% With No Education

6.3

5.8

% With any health insurance

88.6

92.3

% Living in metro area

60.2

61.2

Poverty rate

16.3

11.8

Unemployment

6.19

5.4

Hydrocodone per 100,000

19.5

7.5

26

25

Observations

Notes: The data was obtained from the American Community Survey dataset. The estimates show the characteristics of high and
low hydrocodone prescribing states in 2014.
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Table 1.3 Effect of the Rescheduling of HCPs on Hydrocodone-Acetaminophen
Prescription

VARIABLES

Post * HPR

(1)

(2)

(3)

Total daily
supply

Total 30-day
fill count

Total claim
count

-15.9***

-0.9***

-0.84***

[-20.8, -10.9]

[-1.2, -0.6]

[-1.2, -0.5]

(Implied Effects of the Rescheduling at Mean Pretreatment Hydrocodone Prescription Rate)
Post * HPR

-216.5***
[-284.2, -148]

-12.1***
[-16.8, -7.7]

-11.6***
[-16.0, -7.3]

Demographic Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Economic Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Opioid laws

Yes

Yes

Yes

Marijuana Laws

Yes

Yes

Yes

0.992

0.988

0.989

306

306

306

R-squared

Observations

Notes: Means and confidence interval are reported. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are reported in parentheses.
The data was from the Medicaid Part D dataset. Data were analyzed 2013 to 2018. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

20

Table 1.4 Effect of the Rescheduling of HCPs on the Primary Substance Abused
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Total
Marijuana
Alcohol
Heroin
Cocaine
Methamphetamine
Admissions Admissions Admissions Admissions Admissions
Admissions

Post* HPR

6.6
[-2.2, 15]

3.0***
[1.4, 4.5]

4.6***
[2.0, 7.2]

-3.1*
[-6.3, 0.5]

0.96**
[0.1, 1.8]

-0.15
[-1.3, 1.0]

(Implied Effects of the Rescheduling at Mean Pretreatment Hydrocodone Prescription Rate)

Post * HPR

90.03
[-30, 210]

40.40***
62.77***
-41.74*
[19.6, 61.1] [27.6, 97.9] [-90.3, 6.8]

13.17**
[1.3, 25.0]

-2.07
[-17.9, 13.8]

Demographic
Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Economic
Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Opioid laws

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

648

648

648

648

648

698

0.931

0.927

0.975

0.943

0.968

0.952

Marijuana
Laws
Observations
R-squared

Notes: Means and confidence interval are reported. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are reported in parentheses.
The data source is the Treatment Episode Dataset – Admissions (TEDS – A). Data were analyzed 2005 to 2019. 2014
observations were omitted from the analysis to account for the transition period. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.5 Effect of the Rescheduling of HCPs on the Primary Substance Abused
(Exposure)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Total
Marijuana
Alcohol
Heroin
Cocaine
Methamphetamine
Admissions Admissions Admissions Admissions Admissions
Admissions
Post* HPR

Demographic
Controls
Economic
Controls
Opioid laws
Marijuana
Laws
Observations
R-squared

6.8
[-3.1, 16.6]

2.92***
[1.0, 4.9]

4.83***
[1.4, 8.2]

-3.1*
[-6.7, 0.5]

0.8
[-0.2, 1.9]

-0.7
[-2.3, 1.0]

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

638
0.932

638
0.925

638
0.975

638
0.94

638
0.97

638
0.952

Notes: I use the average hydrocodone prescription data between 2008 to 2011 as exposure variable. Means and confidence
interval are reported. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are reported in parentheses. The data source is the
Treatment Episode Dataset – Admissions (TEDS – A) Data were analyzed 2005 to 2019. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 1.6 Effect of the Rescheduling of HCPs on the Primary Substance Abused (No
Weights)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Total
Marijuana
Alcohol
Heroin
Cocaine
Methamphetamine
Admissions Admissions Admissions Admissions Admissions
Admissions
Post* HPR

Demographic
Controls
Economic
Controls
Opioid laws
Marijuana
Laws
Observations
R-squared

6.55
[-1.6, 14.7]

2.7***
[1.3, 3]

5.5***
[2.1, 8.8]

-3.5**
[-6.9, -0.1]

0.9*
[-0.03, 1.8]

-0.6
[-2.2, 1.0]

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

648
0.92

648
0.92

648
0.97

648
0.92

648
0.92

648
0.95

Notes: For this regression, I drop the population weights. Means and confidence interval are reported. Standard errors are
clustered at the state level and are reported in parentheses. The data source is the Treatment Episode Dataset – Admissions
(TEDS – A) Data were analyzed 2005 to 2019. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Chapter 2
The Rescheduling of Hydrocodone Combination Products and Crime
2.1

Introduction
Prescription opioid abuse carries a high societal and economic cost. Between 1999 and

2018, nearly 450,000 individuals lost their lives after overdosing on opioids (Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, 2020). According to the Council of Economic Advisers, the economic
burden of prescription opioid abuse exceeds $500 billion annually (Council of Economic
Advisors, 2017). As a result, the federal government and several states have implemented
various policies aimed at curbing prescription opioid abuse. One of these policies is the
rescheduling of hydrocodone combination products (HCPs) from a schedule III to a schedule II
controlled substance in 2014. By reducing the supply of HCPs through the rescheduling, the
policy may have had an unintended consequence on the street price of other illegally obtained
opioids, which could impact the crime rate. In this study, I attempt to answer the question of
whether restricting access to hydrocodone combination products could potentially lead to
changes in the crime rate.
While the majority of the research on the economic cost of the opioid epidemic focuses
mainly on the healthcare costs, a few studies have developed methods that estimate the financial
burden of opioid misuse on crime (Birnbaum et al. 2006; Hansen et al. 2011; Florence et al.
2016). The economic burden of prescription opioid abuse on crime includes the cost to the
criminal justice system, the cost borne by the victims and other indirect costs (National Drug
Intelligence Center, 2011). To arrive at the aggregate economic cost of opioid abuse to the
criminal justice system, Birnbaum et al. (2006) compute the cost of opioid abuse to the various
criminal justice system components. Their study uses data from National Forensic Laboratory
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Information System (NFLIS). Birnbaum et al. (2006) estimated that opioid abuse increased
police protection, legal fees and correctional facilities expenses by $438.4 million, $221.2
million, and $771.3 million, respectively, in 2001. Birnbaum et al. (2011) conducted a similar
study for 2007 and found that the cost of opioid use disorder to the criminal justice system
amounted to $5.1 billion for that year. Unlike Birnbaum et al. (2011) and Birnbaum et al. (2006),
Hansen et al. (2011) compute the cost of opioid misuse to crime victims by multiplying the
average cost per victim by the share of drug-related crime victims. Their results suggest that in
2006, the cost of drug-related crimes to crime victims amounted to about $23 billion. Moreover,
Hansen et al. (2011) also find that drug-related crimes decrease productivity by up to $74 billion
per year as a result of incarceration. Another study that assesses the cost of the nonmedical use of
opioids to the criminal justice systems is Florence et al. (2016) study. Using reported criminal
justice spending in addition to other expenses from the Justice Expenditure and Employment
Extracts data, Florence et al. (2016) suggest that opioid prescription abuse increases the criminal
justice cost by over $7.6 billion.

2.2

Literature Review
Several studies have shown that changes in drug-related policies have had unintended

consequences on crime (Dave, Deza, & Horn, 2021; Szalavitz & Rigg, 2017). One of the earliest
pieces of evidence of the association between crime and opioids is from the 1995 disruption of
methamphetamine supply by the government. The United States government, through the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), closed down two producers that supply more than half of
the raw materials used in producing methamphetamine in the entire United States. The
intervention raised the price of methamphetamine from $30 to $100 per gram (Dobkin &
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Nicosia, 2009). Using a difference-in-differences identification strategy, Dobkin and Nicosia
(2009) found that the increase in the price of methamphetamine led to a 50% decline in
methamphetamine arrests. They also find that the policy led to an uptick in robberies. Doleac and
Mukherjee (2019) investigate whether increasing access to naloxone, a drug that quickly reverses
opioid overdose, may affect the crime rate by decreasing the danger of death due to opioid abuse.
Their identification strategy exploits the variation in the timing of the implementation of state
laws that expand naloxone access. They used data from the National Incident-Based Reporting
System, and their study was limited to 33 states. Doleac and Mukherjee (2019) find that the law
led to an increase in all opioid-related crimes and opioid-related theft by 6.0 offenses per million
and 0.4 offenses per million, respectively.
Another study that examines the relationship between crime and changes in opioid
regulation is Mallatt (2018). Mallatt (2018) studies the effect of prescription drug monitoring
programs (PMDP) on heroin crime rates. The prescription drug monitoring program (PDMP)
was implemented to eliminate doctor-shopping practices and to maintain an electronic record of
patients and opioid prescriptions. After exploring the variation in the timing of the
implementation of the prescription drug monitoring programs (PDMP), Mallatt (2018) finds that
the PDMP law led to 2.1 additional heroin-related crimes per 100,000 residents in a month. A
recent study by Dave et al. (2021) also finds that policies that restrict access to opioid
prescription may have unintended consequences on crime. Specifically, Dave et al. (2021), using
a differences-in-differences identification strategy, maintain that the mandatory-access
requirement of the Prescription Drug Monitoring Program has led to a 5% decline in the overall
crime rate. Dave et al., (2021) find that the change in the overall crime was especially driven by
the decrease in burglary, assault, and motor vehicle theft arrest.
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Restricting access to prescription opioids could potentially have a spillover effect on
crime. Clinical studies show that opioid misuse stimulates individuals to commit crimes to
support their lifestyle, with heavy opioid abusers committing significantly more crimes than
moderate abusers (Hammersley et al. 1989). The rescheduling of hydrocodone combination
products serves as a negative supply shock for legally obtained opioid prescriptions. The adverse
supply shock may lead to an increase in the price of redirected legally-obtained opioids, which
could lead HCPs abusers to find a cheaper alternative or pay higher prices. In theory, the
rescheduling of the HCPs could lead to an increase in property and violent crimes if substance
abusers engage in criminal activities to afford the increase in the price of HCPs, assuming they
depend on criminal activities to fund their addiction. On the other hand, if they choose to
withdraw from abusing drugs, it could lead to a decrease in the crime rate.

2.2.1

The Rescheduling of Hydrocodone Combination Products
Due to the high potential for abuse, the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) places all

substances into one of five schedules. Substances with the highest potential abuse are placed in
Schedule I, and substances with relatively less potential for abuse are placed in Schedules V.
Hydrocodone Combination Products contain a limited amount of hydrocodone and specified
amounts of other substances. According to the United Nations, the United States consumed 99%
of the global production of hydrocodone in 2010 (United Nations International Narcotic Control
Board, 2012). Following the increase in people taking hydrocodone combination products in
dangerous amounts, the Drug Enforcement Administration requested the United States
Department of Health and Human Services to conduct thorough research on hydrocodone
combination products in 2009.
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After evaluating the scientific and medical evidence of the benefits and costs of
hydrocodone combination products, the Health and Human Services suggested that all
Hydrocodone Combination Products be transferred from a Schedule III substance to a Schedule
II controlled substance. The main difference between Schedule III controlled substances and
Schedule II substances is that Schedule II substances have a higher potential for abuse. Unlike
Schedule III substances, Schedule II prescriptions must be prescribed for a legitimate medical
purpose must be presented to the pharmacy in written form and signed by the prescriber except
in an emergency. Also, while Schedule III prescriptions can be refilled up to 5 times in a sixmonth period, Schedule II prescriptions cannot be refilled, and a new prescription must be
printed every time.
After the rescheduling of hydrocodone combination products, a few studies have shown
that the policy has led to changes in medical opioid prescription (Zalts et al., 2016; Liu, Baker,
Schuur, & Weiner, 2020). By comparing the predicted dispensed prescriptions and actual
dispensed prescriptions, Zalts et al., (2016) find that the rescheduling of HCPS led to a 16%
decrease in hydrocodone combination products in the first year of the policy. Similarly, Oehle et
al., (2016) examine pain-related prescription data at the emergency department before and after
the rescheduling of HCPs. They find that new patients are less likely to be prescribed
hydrocodone combination products.

2.3 Data and Empirical Strategy
To investigate the impact of the rescheduling of HCPs on crime, I obtained crime and law
enforcement data from the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program from the Federal Bureau
27

of Investigation. The UCR program provides crime data on all the 50 states and the District of
Columbia through the state's UCR program. This data consists of the various arrest counts by
state and the number of police and civilian officers per 100,000 residents in a state. Data from
the 2006 to 2019 UCR program was collected for this study. The outcome variables I consider
are what the FBI classifies as Part I crimes. The FBI uses the reported Part I crimes from each
state to calculate the crime rate at any given time. They include violent crimes, robbery, rape,
property crimes, larceny, homicide, burglary, motor vehicle theft, aggravated assault per 100,000
in a state.
I identify the effect of the rescheduling of hydrocodone combination products on crime
by exploiting the cross-state variation in the pre-treatment hydrocodone prescription rate.
Conceptually, the effect of the rescheduling should have more "bite" in states with a larger preimplementation hydrocodone prescription rate. Several health economists use this approach
(Finkelstein, 2007; Courtemanche, Marton, Ukert, Yelowitz, & Zapata, 2016; Alpert, Powell, &
Pacula, 2018; Evans, Lieber, & Power, 2019). Alpert et al. (2018) and Evans et al. (2018) use
this "bite"-style approach to estimate the impact of the 2010 OxyContin reformulation on heroin
and other types of opioid overdoses. By exploiting the variations in the pre-reformulation
OxyContin misuse rates across states, Alpert et al. (2018) find that heroin overdose deaths were
significantly larger in states with higher pre-reformulation OxyContin misuse rates. I use
variations in the hydrocodone prescription rate prior to rescheduling hydrocodone combination
products. I obtained hydrocodone prescription data in each state in 2006 from the Automation of
Reports and Consolidated Orders System (ARCOS). The Automation of Reports and
Consolidated Orders System (ARCOS) maintains a system that tracks the production and
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distribution of controlled substances in the United States through the Drug Enforcement
Administration.
The model that estimates the impact of the rescheduling of hydrocodone combination on
crime is as follows:
Yst = b0 + b1Postt + b2HPRs + b3(HPRs * Postt) + b4Xst + est

(1)

Yst is the outcome variable, which is the crime rate in state s, and in year t. Postt is an indicator
for whether the period is either before or after 2014 (the year of the rescheduling). HPRs is the
hydrocodone prescription rate in state s in 2006. Xst is a set of demographic and economic
control variables. I collected data on income distribution and unemployment rate from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). I obtained state-level socioeconomic characteristics such as
age, race, gender, education, marital status from the American Community Survey (ACS), which
was downloaded from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS). I also control for
other state-level laws that can affect the supply of opioids by extending the database created by
Meara et al. (2016) on the various state-level opioid prescription laws from 2012 to 2019. These
policies include doctor-shopping prevention laws, patient identification requirements, tamperresistant prescription forms regulations, and prescription limit legislations.
To test whether, in the absence of the rescheduling of the hydrocodone combination
products, the differences in the outcomes would have continued in the same trends, I employed
an event study analysis. The event study interacts the hydrocodone prescription rate with the full
set of year fixed effects, leaving 2013 as the reference year. The event study equation is specified
as:
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If the parallel trend assumption holds, I would expect the interaction of the year indicator for
2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, and the hydrocodone prescription rate to be
statistically insignificant. Additionally, finding a trend prior to the rescheduling of hydrocodone
poses a threat the validity of the identification strategy.

2.4

Results
In Table 2.1, I present the summary statistics for the Part I offenses reported to police by

various law enforcement agencies. These offenses include violent crimes, robbery, rape, property
crimes, larceny, homicide, burglary, aggravated assault per 100,000 adults. The table has four
columns. In columns 1 to 2, I report the pre-and post-rescheduling means and standard deviations
of all the outcome variables for the states with a low hydrocodone prescription rate. Columns 3
and 4 also report the pre-and post-rescheduling means and standard deviations of all the outcome
variables for the states with a high hydrocodone prescription rate.
In terms of the pre-rescheduling crime rates for the low hydrocodone prescribing states,
there were about 429.06 violent crimes per 100,000 residents, with 260 (61%) of these
constituting aggravated assault crimes and 36 (8%) being rape crimes. The property crime with
the highest crime rate is larceny, with 2,280 offenses per 100,000 residents, while the least
frequent property crime is robbery with 125.1 offenses per 100,000 residents. In the postrescheduling period, violent and property crimes declined by approximately 6% and 21%,
respectively. I find similar estimates in high hydrocodone prescribing states. On average,
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aggravated assaults, rape, and homicide offenses were slightly higher in high hydrocodone
prescribing states compared to low hydrocodone prescribing states.
I continue with the discussion of the results by presenting the effect of the rescheduling
of hydrocodone combination products on crime in Table 2.3. I report the coefficient B1 from
Equation (2) using state-year level data from the UCR. Table 2.3 has nine columns representing
the nine aggregated crime counts. The regression was weighted using population weights. For
each aggregated crime count, I report the regression coefficient, the confidence interval, and
statistical significance of the estimated coefficient. I include economic, demographic, and statespecific linear time trends in the estimation of the coefficient to control for potential
confounders.
The results in Table 2.3 suggest an important finding. I find evidence that the
rescheduling of HCPs significantly increases specific types of crime. Specifically, the
rescheduling of HCPs are found to significantly increase violent crimes. The estimate for the
violent crime rate implies that a state with the average pre-treatment hydrocodone prescription
rate (i.e., 13.6 kg of hydrocodone per 100,000 residents) had 23.9 offenses per 100,000 residents
increment in the violent crime rate following the rescheduling of HCPs. The observed increase in
violent crimes is purportedly driven by an increase in aggravated assault crimes. I find that the
rescheduling of HCPs increases aggravated assaults crimes by 15 offenses per 100,000 residents.
Furthermore, there is no evidence to support the claim that the rescheduling of HCPs have had
any statistically significant effect on property crimes.
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Figure 2.1 Effect of the Rescheduling on Crime

Figures 2.1 present the event study results. The event study results represent the
coefficients B2 from Equation (2) which corresponds to the interaction of the year indicator for
2006,2007,2008,2009,2010, 2011, 2012, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, and the hydrocodone
prescription rate for violent and property crime rates. In Figure 2.1, the result suggests that the
rescheduling of HCPs did not affect crime rates in any statistically significant way for property
crimes. I find little to no effects of restricting access to HCPs on larceny, burglary, and motor
vehicle theft. The event study result for robbery offenses exhibits limited evidence of parallel
trends in the pre-treatment period. I find that the lead pre-policy effects are statistically
indistinguishable from zero for aggravated assault offenses. The increase in aggravated assault
offenses occurs after the implementation of the rescheduling of HCPs. Put together, the result
suggests that the rescheduling of HCPs was not endogenously implemented in response to
changes in the crime rate.
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2.5

Conclusion
In the United States, prescription opioid abuse remains an urgent public health

emergency. Survey data from the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration
(SAMHSA) indicates that over 10 million people misused prescription opioids in 2018. Due to
the high economic burden of the opioid epidemic, the DEA has implemented several policies to
combat opioid abuse. One of these policies is the rescheduling of HCPs. Upon assessing the
medical evidence related to drug products containing hydrocodone, combined with other
analgesics, the Department of Health and Human Services recommended that all Hydrocodone
Combination Products be transferred from a Schedule III substance to a Schedule II controlled
substance. In this study, I examine the effect of the rescheduling of hydrocodone combination
products on the changes in crime rate.
The introduction of the rescheduling of HCPs acts as a negative supply shock for opioid
prescriptions. While the impact of the rescheduling on crime is not particularly obvious, I believe
the main channel through which the policy may affect the crime rate is through the decrease in
the supply of HCPs on the illegal market. Individuals who were previously consuming HCPs
may now need to use unlawful means to obtain HCPs. One major contribution of this study is
that I provide some of the first quantitative evidence of the impact of the rescheduling on crime.
I find suggestive evidence that the rescheduling of HCPs have led to an increase in
violent crimes. The estimate suggests that placing HCPs in a more restrictive schedule increased
the violent crime rate by about 23.9 offenses per 100,000 residents. The rise in violent crimes
was driven by the increase in aggravated assault offenses. The increase in aggravated assaults
following the rescheduling of HCPs may reflect the increase in the cost of obtaining illegal
substances on the black market, causing substance-using criminals to commit riskier crimes for
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higher payouts. Secondly, I find no consistent evidence that the rescheduling of HCPs had a
significant effect on property crimes. Overall, this study shows that the rescheduling of HCPs
may have unintended consequences on crime. Thus, policymakers should understand these
broader spillovers of opioid-related interventions.
Table 2.1 Summary Statistics of Outcome Variables

Variables

Outcomes (per 100,000)
Violent
Property
Homicide
Rape
Robbery
Assault
Larceny
Burglary
MV Theft

(1)
Pre-treatment
means
Low OPR

(3)
Posttreatment
means
Low OPR

(2)
Pretreatment
means
High
OPR

(4)
Posttreatment
means
High OPR

429.06
(274.9)
3167.8
(870.2)
4.8
(4.7)
36.4
(16.5)
125.1
(141.5)
260.0
(145.5)
2280.7
(553.3)
611.9
(189.2)
275.2
(216.1)
234

402.3
(239.6)
2476.1
(849.4)
4.9
(4.5)
36.5
(19.7)
91.56
(92.2)
252.4
(145.1)
1866.5
(649.2)
385.1
(138.4)
224.5
(135)
130

499.4
(166.2)
3757.9
(671.8)
6.3
(2.5)
38.8
(9.7)
123.1
(58.7)
327.9
(129.3)
2527.2
(446.2)
915.4
(254.1)
315.3
(141.6)
225

488.7
(153.8)
3003.1
(592.4)
6.9
(2.6)
39.5
(10.6)
96.0
(45.0)
330.5
(124)
2107.5
(413.1)
603.0
(179.7)
292.6
(64.1)
125

Observations
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Data were analyzed 2006 to 2019 for the TEDS-A dataset. The Medicaid Part D
data were analyzed from 2013 to 2014. States with hydrocodone prescription rate below the median of 11.1 kg per 100,000
persons were classified as low HPR states while states with hydrocodone prescription rate above the median rate were classified
as high HPR states.
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Table 2.2 Summary Statistics of State Characteristics
Demography Characteristics
Low Hydrocodone Prescribing
States
49.0
(1.2)

High Hydrocodone
Prescribing States
48.8
(0.7)

% Below 20 years

23.9
(2.4)

25.0
(2.4)

% 20 – 40 years

23.2
(3.3)

23.3
(1.5)

% 40 – 60 years

28.1
(2.4)

27.3
(1.9)

% White

79.5
(16.6)

79.4
(9.7)

% Black

15
(19.9)

21.8
(19)

% Hispanic

7.8
(5.9)

9.6
(10.7)

% Single

41.2
(4.6)

40.1
(2.5)

% Married

43.6
(4.4)

43.3
(2.3)

% Separated

9.7
(1.2)

10.8
(1.2)

% With Zero kids

73.3
(2.6)

72.8
(1.7)

% With No Education

6.0
(0.9)

6.6
(0.8)

% With high school degree

29.9
(3.7)

31.4
(3.4)

% Male

35

Poverty rate

11.12
(2.78)

14.7
(3.2)

Unemployment rate

5.34
(2.0)

6.2
(2.3)

Officer per 100,000

394.9
(141.7)

394.0
(95.4)

364

350

Observations

Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Data were analyzed 2006 to 2019 for the TEDS-A dataset. The Medicaid Part D

data were analyzed from 2013 to 2014. States with hydrocodone prescription rate below the median of 11.1 kg per 100,000
persons were classified as low HPR states while states with hydrocodone prescription rate above the median rate were classified
as high HPR states.
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Table 2.3 Effect of the Rescheduling of Hydrocodone Combination Products on Crime: Analysis 2006 – 2019

VARIABLES

Post * HPR

(1)

(2)

Violent

Property

1.751**
[0.3, 3.2]

2.01
[-5.7, 9.7]

(3)
Homicide

0.03
[-0.0, 0.1]

(4)
Rape

0.1
[-0.1, 0.2]

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

Robbery

Assault

Larceny

MV Theft

Burglary

2.4
[-1.9, 6.7]

0.848
[-1.8, 3.5]

-1.2
[-3.5, 1.1]

0.5
1.10**
[-0.2, 1.3] [0.1, 2.1]

Implied Effects of the Rescheduling at Mean Pretreatment Hydrocodone Prescription Rate
Post * HPR

23.9**
(10.1)

27.4
(52.3)

0.4
(0.3)

1.2
(1.0)

7.3
(5.3)

15.0**
(6.6)

32.3
(29.2)

11.6
(18.2)

-16.4
(15.4)

State F.E

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year F.E

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Other Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

714

714

714

561

714

714

714

714

714

Notes: Means and confidence intervals are reported. Standard errors, clustered at the states level. Data were analyzed from 2006 to 2019. The first row in each column reports the estimated coefficient
of the rescheduling of hydrocodone combination products on the outcome variable. All estimates are weighted using the state’s population.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Chapter 3
Does Expanding Health Insurance Coverage Lead to an Increase in Substance Abuse
Treatment Utilization?
3.1

Introduction
Despite the growing number of persons with substance use disorder (SUD), only a small

proportion of these individuals seek and complete any SUD treatment. According to the National
Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH), in 2019, over 20.4 million people above the age of
12 suffered from alcohol use disorder, illicit drug use disorder, or both in the United States (U.S).
Similarly, the percentage of adults with any mental health illness increased from 17.7% in 2018
to 20.6% in 2019. Yet, only 1.5% of these individuals with substance use disorder received
treatment in 2019 (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Service Administration, 2020). In
addition, another 30% of individuals with SUD receiving treatment leave the treatment facility
against medical advice (Ti and Ti, 2015). One of the significant factors contributing to the low
treatment rates for substance abuse is the lack of health insurance coverage. As a result, I
investigate the impact of the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) Medicaid expansion on the access and
the utilization of substance use disorder treatment in this chapter.
Several studies have shown that a history of substance use disorder and mental illness has
an adverse impact on labor market outcomes, education, and health. Individuals with mental
health disorders and substance use disorders earn significantly lower wages on average.
Similarly, employees with SUD report more missed workdays than their counterparts. A
descriptive study of the occupational impact of substance abuse at the workplace by Goplerud et
al. (2017) maintains that an employee with substance abuse disorder increases a company's
expenditure by up to $13,000 per year. SUD patients that fail to complete treatment are exposed
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to a greater level of in-hospital mortality (Choi, Kim, Qian, & Palepu, 2011). Substance abuse at
the national level increases the U.S deficit by about $ 740 billion annually (National Institute on
Drug Abuse, 2020). These findings suggest that, when left untreated, substance use disorder
exerts severe health and economic burden on both the individual and society.
In most cases, substance use disorder can be effectively treated after a thorough
evaluation and assessment of the patient. A majority of substance abuse patients require longterm care, counselling, medication, and behavioral therapy to be effectively treated. Patients can
also receive treatment in many different settings, including long-term residential treatment,
short-term residential treatment, outpatient treatment programs, individualized drug counselling,
and group counselling. The current substance abuse treatment resources available in the U.S
include (1) allowing people with drug abuse disorder to gradually withdraw from the use of illicit
drugs through detoxification; (2) the treating of the psychological aspect of the disorder through
drug-free programs; and (3) the provision of medication under the medication maintenance
program.
Early intervention and treatment mitigate the risk of mild substance use condition into
developing into a severe disorder. The immediate benefits of receiving treatment include an
improvement in the individual's physical health and social well-being. SUD treatment also
generates positive externalities. Using cost-benefit ratio analysis, Zarkin et al., (2005) estimate
that every $1 expenditure on methadone treatment generates $37.72 in benefits over a lifetime.
Likewise, workers with substance use disorder and receiving treatment save employers almost
$2,607 per employee annually (National Safety Council, 2016). Using data from the Health
Insurance Flexibility and Accountability (HIFA) waivers, one study finds that a 10% increase in
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substance abuse treatment rate reduces criminal justice expenditure by about $2.9 billion. (Wen,
Hockenberry, & Cummings, 2014).
While substance abuse treatment could lead to positive outcomes, there are several
reasons why people do not seek treatment or fail to complete treatment. A significant barrier to
receiving treatment is the decline in substance use disorder screening demand. Moreover, over
30% of individuals with a substance use problem do not have health insurance or cannot afford
the cost of treatment (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2016).
Hence, theoretically, increasing access to affordable health care could potentially increase
admissions into substance abuse disorder treatment facilities by reducing out-of-pocket treatment
expenses. Other determinants of the likelihood of seeking or completing treatment include
physical distance to a treatment center, type of substance, employment status, age at initiation,
and gender (Beardsley, Wish, Fitzelle, O'Grady, & Arria, 2003; Greenfield et al., 2007).

3.2

Literature Review
Following the implementation of the Affordable Care Act, individuals with substance use

disorder have greater access to treatment through various programs and policy changes. The
Medicaid expansion provides health insurance coverage to individuals with income below 138%
of the federal poverty line. The ACA integrated and extended the provisions of the 2008 Mental
Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act (MHPAEA). By classifying the screening and treatment
of substance use disorder as essential insurance benefits, the ACA requires the screening and
treatment of substance abuse to be included in all health plans. Furthermore, insurance
companies can no longer deny insurance coverage to individuals with a history of drug abuse
treatment because of pre-existing conditions through regulatory insurance reforms.
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Using a quasi-experimental difference-in-differences design, one research finds that the
Medicaid expansion under the ACA led to a 14 percentage points decrease in the number of
uninsured persons with SUD in expansion states (Olfson, Wall, Barry, Mauro, & Mojtabai,
2018). Similarly, private health insurance coverage increases by about 5.4 percentage points
(Saloner, Antwi, Maclean, & Cook, 2017). Wen et al. (2017) find an increase in buprenorphine
utilization and Medicaid-assisted treatment for SUD after the Medicaid expansion. Meinhofer
and Witman (2018), like the Maclean and Saloner (2017) study, use the Treatment Episode Data
Set Admissions (TEDS-A) from 2007 to 2015 to evaluate the early effects of the Medicaid
Expansion on opioid admissions to speciality treatment facilities. Meinhofer and Witman (2018)
results show that Medicaid expansion led to an 18% increase in overall opioid admissions, which
was mostly driven by rehabilitation and medication-assisted treatment admissions. Similarly,
Maclean and Saloner (2019), using a difference-in-differences approach, find that Medicaid
expansion increased aggregate admissions in expansion states by 7.8% and Medicaid-reimbursed
prescriptions in outpatient settings increased by 43%.
This study makes one significant contribution to the literature on the impact of the ACA
Medicaid expansion on substance use disorder treatment. I provide evidence of the ACA's effect
on the utilization of drug abuse treatment and the treatment completion rates among substance
use disorder patients. I use the Treatment Episodes Dataset (TEDS) to study the variations in
treatment completion rates across states following the implementation of the enactment of the
ACA.
I found that the ACA Medicaid expansion led to a 36 % decrease in the number of
uninsured substance abuse patients and a 90% increase in Medicaid insurance coverage among
the same group. Following the gains in insurance coverage among substance abuse patients, one
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would expect an increase in substance abuse treatment utilization. I measured substance abuse
treatment utilization using the number of admissions per 100,000 non-elderly adults and
treatment completion status. The results indicate that the ACA's Medicaid expansion had no
statistically significant effect on substance abuse treatment admissions. Similarly, the policy had
no statistically significant effect on the likelihood of dropping out of substance abuse treatment
and the likelihood of substance use disorder patients being terminated by the treatment facility.
However, there remains some evidence of a decrease in the number of SUD patients who
complete their treatment following the implementation of the policy.

3.3

Data and Empirical Strategy
This empirical analysis attempts to estimate the causal effect of the ACA's Medicaid

expansion on several outcomes: insurance coverage (i.e., Medicaid, private insurance,
uninsured), source of payment for treatment (i.e., Self-pay, government assistance, insurance),
and SUD treatment utilization (admissions and discharges) among substance use disorder
patients.
The primary source of data for this study is the Treatment Episode Data Set (TEDS),
which is collected by the Substance abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. The
TEDS is a compilation of data of admissions and discharges from substance abuse treatment
centers in the U.S. While the data does not include every admission into treatment facilities in
the U.S, it captures a large percentage of admissions nationwide13. The data reported to TEDS is
obtained from certified state substance abuse agencies that provide substance abuse treatment.

13

According to SAMHSA, nearly 2 million individuals are admitted into 10,000 publicly and privately funded
treatment programs each year.
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Each record in the TEDS table represents admission into a treatment facility. The TEDS data
contains demographic information, date of admission, substance use behavior, and primary
substance use at the admission of substance abuse patients, number of previous admissions,
length of stay, and reason for discharge for individuals who are 12 years old or older. Data from
2005 to 2018 TEDS-A and TEDS-D surveys were retrieved for this study.
I examined the Medicaid expansion's impact on insurance coverage among individuals
seeking admission into a SUD program for my first analysis. While the Medicaid expansion led
to an increase in eligibility, it may not necessarily translate into an increase in access and
utilization due to several factors. Barriers to utilization of healthcare include work
responsibilities, the patient's perception that they will receive improper treatment due to being
enrolled in Medicaid, lack of available appointment times, and the fear that they might incur an
additional cost for treatment.
Between 2005 and 2018, 22 U.S states did not report respondents' health insurance status
to the TEDS. As a result, I confined the health insurance coverage analysis to 29 states and the
District of Columbia. I refer to the states that report the health insurance status in this study as
the health insurance sample. Using the insurance status data, I constructed four dependent
variables: private insurance status, Medicaid insurance status, other insurance, and uninsured.
The equation that estimates the model is specified as:
Insurance Statusst = b0 + b1Medicaidst + b2Xst + ds +gt + est

(1)

Insurance Statusst is an indicator for Medicaid, private health insurance, and uninsured.
Medicaidst is an indicator for whether or not a state has expanded its Medicaid in year t. Xst is a
set of economic and demographic control variables. ds is the state fixed effect, and gt is the year
fixed effect. est is the error term.
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In my second analysis, I examined the effect of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion on
substance use admissions and treatment completion rates. To measure admissions into SUD
facilities, I followed Maclean and Saloner (2019) by constructing a variable that measures the
number of individuals admitted into a treatment facility per 100,000 adults in a state-year. I
collected annual population estimates from the U.S census bureau. The proportion of individuals
between 18 to 64 years is derived using Current Population Survey(CPS) data downloaded from
the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS).
I constructed additional outcome variables using the TEDS-D. They include an indicator
for whether an individual completed a SUD treatment program, left treatment against
professional advice, and treatment terminated by facility due to non-compliance. These variables
were constructed from the TEDS-D survey question that asks "REASON FOR DISCHARGE"
where the options include "TREATMENT COMPLETED", "LEFT AGAINST
PROFESSIONAL ADVICE", "TERMINATED BY FACILITY", "TRANSFERRED TO
ANOTHER FACILITY", "INCARCERATED", "DEATH" or "OTHER". I categorized
individuals who completed treatment or got transferred to another facility as having completed
treatment. These measures have not been used in previous studies, and so I break new ground in
this area.
Yst = b0 + b1Medicaidst + b2Xst + ds +gt + est

(2)

Equation (1) estimates the differences in health care coverage and substance abuse
admission and treatment completion rates by exploiting the variation in the timing of the
Medicaid expansion across states. The outcome variable, Yst is equal to the count of persons
admitted into a substance abuse treatment facility per 100,000 persons between the age of 18 and
64 years. It is also a binary measure of whether substance abuse treatment was completed (i.e,
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completed treatment, left against medical advice, terminated by treatment facility). Medicaidst is
an indicator for whether or not a state has expanded its Medicaid in year t. Xst is a set of
economic and demographic control variables. ds is the state fixed effect, and gt is the year fixed
effect. est is the error term. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. I estimated the
outcomes using the population of individuals between the ages of 18 and 64 as weights.
I included several control variables that are associated with substance use disorder
treatment in the regression model. The state-level independent control variables can be classified
into demographic or economic characteristics. I obtained data on age, sex, education, marital
status, and poverty level from the Current Population Survey dataset. Lastly, I control for statelevel unemployment data collected from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
I obtained data on whether states implemented the Medicaid expansion from the Kaiser
Family Foundation policy. In the majority of the states that adopted the Medicaid expansion, the
policy became effective on January 1, 2014. A few states, including California, Connecticut,
Minnesota, New Jersey, Washington, and the District of Columbia, expanded their Medicaid
program before 2014. In contrast, Maine and Virginia implemented their Medicaid expansion in
2018. I assigned an expansion date to each state that adopted and implemented the policy. By
2018, a total of 34 states in the TEDS expanded their Medicaid program.
I performed an event study analysis to evaluate the assumption that differences in
admission and treatment completion rates across states would have continued with the same
trends in the absence of the Medicaid expansion. The event study model is stated as Equation (3).
0

!!" = b# + b % &Medicaid%&(&()*+) - + b- ../ + d. + g/ + e./
$

1(23
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(0)

In equation 3, I included m leads and q lags to control for the multiple treatment periods.
The base year(i.e., j=0) is the year before a state expanded its Medicaid program. Assuming there
are identical counterfactual trends in both treatment and control states, the bj coefficient for all
the leads should be statistically insignificant. Similarly, if the effect of the Medicaid expansion
multiplies over time, the coefficients of bj for j>0 will increase in j.

3.4

Results
In Table 3.1, I present the means and standard deviations for the outcome and control

variables in expansion and non-expansion states using data from 2013 (i.e., the year before most
states expanded their Medicaid program). I estimate a substance use disorder admission rate of
1041.9 per 100,000 elderly adults in expansion states and a rate of 852.6 per 100,000 elderly
adults in non-expansion states in 2013. The data also shows that a higher proportion of SUD
patients completed the SUD treatment in non-expansion states compared to expansion states.
Similarly, while only 23.04 percent of patients dropped from the SUD treatment program in nonexpansion states, the dropout rate for patients in expansion states was 25.05 percent.
I estimate that 55.4% of all substance abuse disorder patients in expansion states had no
insurance, 12.6% had private insurance, 21.4% had Medicaid insurance, and 10.8% had other
types of insurance. However, in non-expansion states, I estimate that 70% of substance disorder
patients had no insurance, 7.1% had private insurance, 16.3% had Medicaid insurance, and 7.2%
had other types of insurance coverage. The state characteristics are also nearly comparable across
the groups. The non-expansion group had an average age of 40.18 years, while the expansion
group had an average age of 40.57 years. Similarly, while 51.1% of the expansion group were
female, 51.2% of the non-expansion group were female. On average, families in the expansion
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group earn $8,422.69 more than families in the non-expansion group. Lastly, the expansion
group had a higher unemployment rate on average than the non-expansion group.
I continue with the discussion of the results by presenting the implied effect of the ACA
Medicaid expansion on health insurance status. The analysis in Table 3.2 is restricted to states
that provide data on the insurance status of the substance abuse disorder patient. Column (1)
reports the effect of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion on the uninsured. Column (2) reports the
impact of the Medicaid expansion on Medicaid insurance coverage. Column (3) and Column (4)
report the effect of the Medicaid expansion on private health insurance coverage and other types
of insurance, respectively. I find that the ACA’s Medicaid expansion is associated with a 20
percentage points decrease in the uninsured rate, which translates to a 36.36% decrease relative
to the mean in the expansion group in 2013. The policy is also associated with a 19 percentage
points increase in Medicaid insurance coverage which translates to a 90% increase in Medicaid
insurance coverage relative to the mean in the expansion group in 2013. The Medicaid expansion
had no statistically significant effect on private health insurance coverage and other types of
insurance coverage among substance use disorder patients.
Table 3.3 reports the effect of the Medicaid expansions on SUD treatment admissions and
treatment completion rates. I find that the Medicaid expansion had no statistically significant
effect on the number of patients per 100,000 non-elderly adults admitted into a substance abuse
treatment program. For substance abuse discharges, I find that the Medicaid expansion decreases
the likelihood of completing substance use disorder treatment. The ACA’s Medicaid expansion
led to a 3.9 percentage points decrease in the likelihood of a patient completing a substance
abuse treatment program. The policy is also associated with an increase in the likelihood of
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dropping out of substance abuse treatment and the likelihood of SUD patients being terminated
by the treatment facility. However, these effects are not statistically distinguishable from zero.

Figure 3.1 Effect of the Medicaid expansion on Insurance Status

Figure 3.2 Effect of the Medicaid Expansion on Substance Abuse Treatment Utilization

As indicated in Figure 3.1, the event study model suggests that the ACA Medicaid
expansion led to increases in the year-by-year likelihood of having Medicaid insurance among
substance use disorder patients. The increase in Medicaid coverage began immediately after the
adoption of the ACA’s Medicaid. However, there was no statistically significant effect of the
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expansion on the probability of having Medicaid insurance coverage by year three. The
likelihood of being uninsured began declining immediately after the implementation of the ACA
Medicaid expansion. Similarly, with respect to private insurance coverage, I observe a decline in
the probability of having private health insurance coverage over time, even among substance
abuse patients. Figure 3.2 presents the event study results for substance abuse admissions and
treatment status. I observe evidence of non-parallel trends in the pre-treatment period for
admissions per 100,000 non-elderly adults and SUD treatment status. While I observe an upward
trend in admissions into substance abuse treatment program following the expansion of Medicaid
insurance coverage, the effect is statistically insignificant. I also find limited evidence of the
impact of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion on SUD treatment status.

3.5

Conclusion
In this chapter, I study the effect of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion on health insurance

coverage and healthcare utilization among substance abuse patients. Under the ACA’s Medicaid
expansion, individuals with income below 138% of the federal poverty line can obtain health
insurance coverage through the Medicaid insurance program. Various studies have shown that
individuals with substance abuse problems have lower income levels and are more likely to be
unemployed. Hence, by providing affordable health insurance to these individuals, we could
expect an increase in healthcare coverage and utilization among substance abuse patients.
Consistent with other studies, evidence from this research shows that the ACA’s Medicaid
expansion led to a 90% increase in Medicaid insurance coverage among substance abuse
patients. I also find that the Medicaid expansion is associated with a 36% decline in the number
of uninsured persons with substance abuse disorder.
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One major contribution of this study is that I provide evidence of the impact of the
ACA’s Medicaid expansion on treatment completion status and admissions into substance abuse
treatment program. I find that the ACA’s Medicaid expansion had no statistically significant
effect on the number of persons admitted into substance abuse treatment programs. This implies
that access to health insurance coverage alone may not impose a significant barrier to seeking
substance abuse treatment. This study also shows that the ACA’s Medicaid expansion had no
statistically significant on the probability of dropping out of substance abuse treatment program
and the probability of substance use disorder patients being terminated by the treatment facility.
On the contrary, I find that the ACA’s Medicaid expansion is associated with a decrease in the
number of SUD patients who complete their treatment following the implementation of the
policy.
Table 3.1 Summary Statistics
Substance use disorder Treatment Utilization
Expansion States
Admissions per 100,000

1041.9
(654.8)

Non-Expansion
States
852.6
(646.7)

% Completed Treatment

55.7
(16.2)

58.95
(8.9)

% Dropped from Treatment

25.05
(15.6)

23.04
(8.9)

% Treatment terminated by
facility
Insurance status
Private insurance

8.77
(5.5)

9.6
(7.5)

0.126
(0.09)
0.214
(0.197)
0.108
(0.101)

0.071
(0.041)
0.163
(0.131)
0.072
(0.06)

Medicaid insurance
Other insurance
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Uninsured

0.554
(0.210)

0.70
(0.170)

State characteristics
Age
40.57
40.18
Female
0.511
0.512
Male
0.489
0.488
White
0.783
0.803
Black
0.083
0.117
Other races
0.134
0.129
Hispanic
0.093
0.077
Foreign born
0.092
0.069
Less High School
0.294
0.311
High School
0.305
0.31
Some College
0.184
0.19
College degree
0.133
0.122
Married
0.425
0.437
Divorced/Separate
0.16
0.163
Never married
0.416
0.399
Not metro
0.212
0.285
Disabled
.061
0.065
Family income
77,840.34
69,417.65
Unemployment rate
7.942
7.48
Poverty rate
14.268
15.293
Population
3411271.4
4171554.8
Observations
31
20
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Data were analyzed from 2005 to 2018 from the TEDS dataset. Expansion
states refer to states that expanded their Medicaid program under the ACA and non-Expansion states refer to states that did
not expand their Medicaid program.

Table 3.2 Effect of ACA Medicaid Expansions on Insurance Status
(1)
(2)

MedicaidExpansionst

Pre-treatment Mean

(3)

(4)

Uninsured

Medicaid

Private
Insurance

Other
Insurance

-0.2***
[-0.3, -0.1]

0.19***
[0.1, 0.3]

-0.01
[-0.03, 0.01]

0.021
[-0.01, 0.1]

0.55

0.21

0.126

0.10
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Implied Percentage
change

36.4%

90.5%

7.7%

21%

State F.E

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year F.E

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Demographic and
Economic Controls
Observations

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

255

255

255

255

Notes: Data were analyzed from 2005 to 2018. Insurance state sample includes the following states: AK, AL, AR, CO, DC, DE, HI, IA, IL, IN,
KS, KY, MA, MD, ME, MO, MT, ND, NE, NH, NJ, NV, OR, PA, SC, SD, TN, TX, and UT. Standard errors are robust at the state level and are
reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3.3 Effect of ACA Medicaid Expansions on Admissions and Treatment Completion
Rates
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Admissions
Per 100,000

Completed
Treatment

Dropped
Treatment

Terminated by
Facility

115.7
[-39.9, 271.4]

-0.039**
[-0.08, -0.002]

0.015
[-0.01, 0.05]

0.005
[-0.01, 0.02]

1041.9

0.56

0.25

0.08

11%

7%

6%

6.25%

State F.E

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year F.E

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Demographic
and Economic
Controls
Observations

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

450

426

426

426

MedicaidExpan
sionst
Pre-treatment
Mean
Implied
Percentage
change

Notes: Data were analyzed from 2005 to 2018. The dataset for this sample includes all the 51 states. Standard errors are robust at the state level
and are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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